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Models of household labor supply are usually estimated usíng data on
households where both male and female partner work in a paid job, with
correction for selection bias. From an econometric viewpoint, this
approach is unsatisfactory, as a usually large proportion of the avai-
lable data (the one earner families) is not used in the estimation. In
this paper a household labor supply model is estimated using data on
both one earner and two earner families, and using flexible functional
forms (i.c. the AIDS-specification). Sínce in this case there exists no
explicit closed form for the rationed male labor supply equation (i.e.
the male labor supply equation which applies to families with a non-par-
ticipating female), numerical methods are used. For comparison, the
model is also estimated using data on two earner families only.
1
1. Introduction
A distinctive feature of models of female labor supply is the
míxed discrete-continuous nature of the dependent variable. As long as
the female labor supply decision is analyzed in isolation, it is of
minor consequence for the estimation method whether the labor supply (or
leisure demand) equation is derived within a utility maximízation frame-
work or not. In both cases Tobit-like methods are the appropriate tools
for the estimation of the model. A number of authors have estimated
models of female labor supply along these lines, e.g. Heckman (1974),
Hausman (1980) and Zabalza (1983). However, if female labor supply is
analyzed jointly with other household decision variables such as male
labor supply or commodity demands, both modelling and estimatíon within
a utility maximization framework becomes more complicated.
One of the main reasons for this complication is that one has to
derive equations that give optimal demands for all goods and male lei-
sure if the female partner does not work. As has been shown by Deaton
and Muellbauer (1981), the class of utility or cost functions for which
these conditional or rationed demand equations can be derived explicit-
ly, is quite restrictive.
One of the very few empirical studies on household labor supply
and rationing is the paper by Blundell and Walker (1982). In the estíma-
tion of their model only observations on two earner families (i.e. un-
rationed families) are used with a correction for section bias. The ob-
vious drawback of their approach (apart from the fact that they employ a
restrictive functional form) is that a usually large proportion of the
available data (the one earner families) is not iised in the estimatíon.
Moreover, it is possible that parameter estimates based on data on two
earner families only do not apply to one earner families because of fac-
tors not cap[ured by the model.
In this paper we estimate a household labor supply model using
data on both one earner and two earner families, and using flexible
functional forms. Sínce in this case there exists no explicit closed
form for the rationed demand equations, numerical methods are used.
In section 2 we introduce Deaton and Muellbauer's Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) as our choice of functional form for the descrip-
z
tion of household labor supply, we present a simple way of incorporating
family composition effects into the model and we briefly discuss the
theory of rationing within the AIDS-framework. In section 3 the stochas-
tic specification of the model ís presented with the corresponding like-
lihoods. The data is described in section 4. Estimation results are
given in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. AIDS and Rationing
2.1. AIDS
As a specification of the model we choose the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1980b).
Within a labor supply context it has been used before by Ray (1982). The
AIDS cost function has the following form
0(u,wm.wf~P) 3 exp(afu.b) (2.1)
where
a- a0 i- amlog wm f af log wf t a log p t
Y
f 2 Ymm loS2 wm f Ymf l08 wm log wf t YmY log wm log P
t 2 Yff 1082 wf f Yf log wf log PY
1 2
t Z Yyy l08 P~
Bm Bf Sy
b- s0 wm wf P
and
ay - 1 - am - af
Ry~-Rm-Bf
Ymy - -Ymm - Ymf
Yfy - -Yff - Ymf








wm and wf are the male and female wage rate respectively, measured after
taxes and p is the price of consumption y which we treat as a composite
commodity.l) The a's, S's and Y's are parameters.
As is well-known, the unrationed compensated demand for leisure
functions can be found by differentíating the cost function with respect
to wm and wf. The unrationed uncompensated demand functions are found by
solving u from
wmT t wfT t ~- Y- exp(atu.b) (2.8)
(where u is non labor family income (e.g. property income or welfare
benefits) and T is the total number of hours per period of time; Y is
full income) and substituting the solution for u into the unrationed
compensated demand functions.
This leads to the following specifications for the AIDS uncom-
pensated unrationed demand for leisure functions:
Rm -(Ylwm)(am~mm log wm~mf log wff1'my log PtBm log Y-sm.a) (2.9)
Rf -(Ylwf)(af~mf log wm~l'ff log wf{1'fy log Pt6f log Y-Bf-a) (2.10)
where km and Rf are male and female leisure respectively.
In contrast with the linear specifications used by Blundell and
Walker (1982) and those discussed by Deaton and Mullbauer (1981) where
labor supply functions are either everywhere forward bending or every-
where backward bending, the AIDS labor supply functions can be forward
bending in a certain range of wages and backward bending in a different
range.
The effect of family composition on labor supply is modelled by
allowing the a's to depend on the family size:
ai - a~ f ai log N , i- m,f,y (2.11)
1) The extension of the present analysis to a disaggregation of conswnp-
tion is straíghtforward. Since we use cross-section data for the empiri-
cal analysis, the lack of price variation in this data precludes a dis-
aggregation of consumption in the empirical work.
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L a0 - 1, E ai r 0
where N is the number of persons in a family.
It is easily verified that
g w w
3 log N x am log(P) f af log(f)P
(2.12)
(2.13)
which we expect to be positive. Of course, the number of persons in a
family is a rather crude indicator of family composítion, but since the
modelling of demographic variables is not the primary aim of this paper,
we will stick to this rather simple specification. In any case, we allow
the effect of family size to be dífferent for different expenditure
categories. As such it is slightly more general than the specification
used by Ray (1982).
2.2. Rationing
The rationing theory employed here has been developed by Neary
and Roberts (1980) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a, 1981). Let us con-
sider the case where female leisure Rf is restric[ed to be equal to Rf.
Then the rationed cost function for the household is defined as
R - I
~ (u.wm~wf.PrRf) - min (wmkmfwfRffp.y v ~ u) , (2.14)
Y.Rm
where v(km,Rf,y) is the direct household utility function defined on
male and female leisure and total household consumption.
There is a well-known relationship between the rationed and un-
rationed cost function:
R - - - - )~ (u~wm.wf.P.Rf) - ~(u.wm.wf.P) f Rf(wf-wf . (2.15)
where wf -~(u,Rf,wm,p,u) is obtained by settíng the compensated demand
Eor female leisure equal to Rf and solving for Wf~ i.e. Wf is the female
wage rate which would induce the household to choose R- R if theref f
were no rationing.
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The rationed compensated demand for male leisure function is
obtained by differentiating the restricted cost function with respect to
wm. In view of (2.12) this yields
aCR aC(u,wm.wf,P) 3C(u,wm,wf,P) 2wf ówf
awm - 2wm } aW ' 2wm - Rf. aWm
f
óC(u,wm.wf.P) 2wf 8wf




This is just the unrestricted compensated demand at wf - wf. Let a and
b be defined by (2.2) and (2.3) with wf replaced by wf. The uncompen-
sated restricted demand for male leisure function is found by solving u
f rom
Y - exp(afu.b) f Rf(wf-wf) (2.17)
and next substituting the solution for u into the rationed compensated
demand function obtained from (2.16).
We can rewrite (2.17) as
Y - exp(afu.b) , (2.18)
where Y is defined as
Y- Y- Rf(wf-wf) -(T-Rf).wf t Rf.wf f wmT f u (2.19)
Here ( T-Rf).wf i s the amount of money earned by the female partner in
market work. Since wf i s the shadow price of female leisure, w R isf' f
the value to the household of the female leisure. So y is the subjecti-
vely valued full income in the case of rationin~. We already know that
the rationed compensated demand i s equal to the unrationed compensated
7
demand with wf replaced by wf. From (2.18) it is clear that we obtain
the ratíoned uncompensated demand from the unrationed uncompensated
demand if we replace wf everywhere by wf and Y by Y. So, for example,
the restricted demand for male leisure RR is obtained from (2.9) asm
Rm -(Ylwm)(amfl'~ log wmi~`fmf log wf~-`fmy log PfBm log Y-Sm.a) (2.20)
Using (2.10) it is also clear that wf must satisfy:
Rf -(Y~wf)(af~mf log wm~ff l08 wf~1'fy log Ptsf log Y-Bf.a). (2.21)
It follows from the analysis by Neary and Roberts (1980) that if
the parameters of the AIDS specification are such that the direct uti-
lity function v is quasi-concave, there will exist a wf ~ wf satisfying
(2.21) for any Qf in the domain of v. In contrast with the essentially
linear specifications used by, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1981)
and Blundell and Walker (1982), with AIDS there does not exist an expli-
cit solution for wf. T'herefore, in the estimation of the model, numeri-
cal methods will be used.
We will particularly be interested i n the case Rf - T, i .e. when
the female does not have a paid job. In that case we have
Y- wm T t wf T f u (2.22)
which would be the full income if the female wage rate were equal to wf.
It should be emphasized that the present rationing model is es-
sentially different from the Rationed Almost Ideal Demand System (RAIDS)
due tot Deaton (1981). The RAIDS only allows for deriving utility-con-
sistent rationed demand functions, given the ration level. In the pre-
sent case we have a matchE:d pair of ratíoned and unrationed demand func-
tions, consistently describing behavíor under both regimes.
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3. F.stimation
The only form of rationing considered in estimation ís the case
where the female partner attains the maximal amount of leisure, i.e.,
she does not have a paid job. In that case she is rationed at Rf - T. We
shall estimate a model of joint labor supply of the male and the female
partner in a household and of total consumption. As always, the budget
constraint (in this case the full income constraint) allows us to drop
one equation. We have chosen to omit the demand for total consumption
equation so that we are left with a system of two labor supply equations
(or, equivalently, demand for leisure equations) for the male and female
partner.
Let us introduce the following notation with respect to the i-th
household:
i E 61 if both partners work;
i E eo if only the male partner works.
The functional form of the male labor supply changes if a household







R f - T
km - gm(wm~wf.P~u)
~







where gf and gm are the unrestricted AIDS female and male demand for
leisure equations, respectively.
Next, we take up the question of the stochastic specification of
the model. The common practice in estimating demand systems is to add
normally distributed error terms to the demand equations or their share
form, without being specific about the possible sources of the sto-
9
chastic disturbance. Following this approach it seems natural to write
the stochastic version as follows:
~
Rf - gf(wm.wf.P.u) f Ef
Rf - Rf
I
Rm - gm(wm.wf~P~V) f Em ~
Rf-T
Rm - gm(wm.wf.P~V) t em
(3.1')
(3.2')




with em and Ef following a normal dístribution with zero mean and un-
restricted variance covariance matrix.
The error terms in ( 3. 3' ) and ( 3. S' ) are equal since the only
difference is that wf is replaced by wf. However, if the em and ef would
incorporate random preferences, then the error terms in (3.3') and
(3.5') cannot be both additive and normally distributed. For example,
let ef - uf t vf, where uf represents random variation of preferences
across households and vf represents other sources of random variation in
female leisure. Assume both uf and vf to be normally distributed. For a
rationed household, wf is the solution of
T - gf(wm,wf,P,u) f uf (3.6)
As a result the shadow wage wf is a complicated non-linear function of
uf. Hence, wf is a random variable and its distribution is definitely
nonnormal. So, assuming an additive normally dístributed error terms in
(3.1') appears ínconsistent with an additive normally distributed error
term in (3.5').
The non-normality of wf need not be a problem in itself. The
densities that appear in the likelihood function in the case of random
preferences involve the shadow wage, which has to be integrated out.
This can be performed using numerical íntegration techniques and there-
fore, the exact distributional form is of minor importance. However,
generally these densities cannot be ensured to be proper ones. The rea-
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son is that the existence and the uniqueness of the shadow wage cannot
always be guaranteed, unless the cost function is globally concave. It
can be shown that the AIDS cost function is globally concave if and only
if all S's are equal to zero and a(wm,wf,p) given in (2.2) is concave
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b). However, in that case preferences are
homothetic and the flexibility is lost. It appears that, at least for
AIDS, flexibility and global concavity of the cost function are incompa-
tible properties.
In view of these problems, we have adopted the following pragma-
tic solution. The shadow wage wf is defined as the solution of
T ' 8f(wm.wf.P.u) (3.6')
(i.e. (2.21), with Rf - T) and the error term em in (3.5') is replaced
by an error term Em~ which is assumed to be normally distributed, but
its variance and correlation with ef are allowed to be different from
those of e. The foregoing discussion makes clear that if Ef partly re-m
presents random variation of preferences, the distributional assumption
Ron e can only hold true approximately.m
To summarize, we specify the following model:
Rf ' 8f(wm.wf.PrV) f Ef
~
Rf - Rf




Rm - gm(wm.wf.P.u) f em
} ~if R.f ~ T ( 3.1")(3.2")
(3.4")
(3.5")
In the estimation the additive error terms are actually added to






both 9~ and 61 are used. The likelihood of the observations is
~í i ~i Ri ~i
L1 ~ i E el hl(sf ~sm)i E6G TJ h2(sf
~sm )dsf . í3.6)
~
where sf, sm and s~ are the budget shares corresponding to lCf, R,m and
km, respectively and T is defined as T-
sity of sf and sm and
~i i Rdensities are marginals of the joint density of sf , sm and sm .
Case II
Only data on 61 are used. The likelihood of [he observations is




where h3 is the marginal density of sfi.
(3.7)
We estimate the paramaters in the model (3.1")-(3.5") for both
cases. The likelihoods are maximized using a quasi-Newton algorithm
which requires no (analytícal) derivatives, as provided by computer rou-
tines of the NAG-Library (E~4JBF). For Case I, equation (2.21) has to be
solved numerically for all elements of 6~, for all evaluations of the
likelihood function, needed to attain the global maximum of the likelí-
hood and to calculate the estimated (asymptotic) variance-covariance
matrix of the maximum likelihood estimators. The technique used is a
combínation of the methods of linear interpolation, linear extrapolatíon
and bisection (NAG-library, C~SAZF). Although concavity of the cost
function and hence the existence and the uniqueness of wf cannot be
guaranteed for all elements of 8~, the algorithm always found only one
solutíon for W each time equation (2.21) was solved.f
~i
T.wf~Y. hl is the joint den-







The models in section 3 have been estimated using data from a
labor mobility survey in the Netherlands, conducted in the Fall of 1982
by the Netherland Central Bureau of Statistics and the Institute for
Social Research of Tilburg University. The sample has been drawn ran-
domly from the populatíon of all households in the Netherlands whose
head is between 18 and 65 years of age; it contains 1315 households.
From this sample we took a subsample of households containing at
least two adults of different sex, where the male partner is an employed
wage earner. The size of the subsample is 507; in 197 households the
female partner is also an employed wage earner, in 310 households the
female partner does not have a paid job. Thus, we excluded the self-
employed, the households with only one adult, the households where the
male partner is unemployed, retired, going to school, dísabled, etc.
To be able to estimate model (3.1")-(3.5") we need observations
on (potential) wage rates, also of females who díd not have a paid job
at tlie time of the survey. We followed the standard procedure of con-
structing a wage equation for females on the basis of the households for
which we observe the female wage rate. In our sample, this is only the
case for the 139 households where the female partner works at least 15
hours a week.
Using Heckman's procedure to correct for selectivity bias, the
following wage equation was estimated (t-values in parentheses):
wf - 2.14 t 0.26 AGE - 0.003 AGE2 -E 1.68 DUM1 ~-
(0.36) (0.63) (-0.74) (1.32)
2.12 DUM2 t 3.01 DUM3 t 1.69 a, R2 - 0.14
(2.78) (1.23) (1.34)
DUM1, DUM2 and DUM3 are dummy variables to represent education, a is the
estimated inverse of the Mill's-ratio (see Heckman (1979)).
In the estima[ion of the model the predicted values (with omis-
sion of a) for both participating and non-participating females were
used as an instrument for female wage rate.
13
5. Results
The results of the ML-estimation for both cases are summarized
in table 1. In the first place we notice that the estimates obtained in
case I are the most accurate ones, because more observations are used
than in the other case.
In case I the joint hypothesis am a am and p(em'Ef) - p(Em'ef)
is rejected at the 5X-level on the basis of a likelihood ratio test.
Although the differences between the columns seem to be quite
small, a likelihood ratio test of the equality of parameters across
columns rejects the equality hypothesis.I) There may be a number of ex-
planations for these significant differences. For example, ít may be due
to a neglect of the possibly important effect of fixed costs of entering
the labor market, or may be family composition effects should be incor-
porated more elaborately. Whatever the reason might be, it is clear that
one has to be careful ín using data on two earner households only to
also explain the behavior of one earner households, even if selection
bias has been taken into account.
In the remainder of this section we will concentrate on the
estimation results of case I. In figure 1 the labor supply functions
implied by the parameter estímates are drawn.
1) The parameter estimates of case I were inserted in the likelíhood
function of case II and vice versa. In both cases the resulting test
statistic implied rejection at the 5i-level of the equality hypo[hesis.
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Table 1. Estimation resultsa) ( standard erros in parentheses)




































log L 1272.0 913.8
number of
observations 507 197
a) a0 was fixed a priori for computatíonal reasons (see Deaton and
Muellbauer (19806) and Ray (1982)).
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1) All other variables are evaluated at the sample mean.
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The labor supply functions look definitely nonlinear, which un-
derlínes the need to use flexible functional forms.
The male labor supply function is backward bending in the lower
ranges of wm and forward bending for high values of wm. Male labor sup-
ply is rather inelastic, both with respect to wf and wm. Apart from the
familiar interpreta[ion that substitution and income effect more or less
cancel out, this finding may also point at institutional constraints
which keep most males at a 40-hour work week. Notice that hR tends to bemeven less elastíc with respect to wm in ratíoned families, where the
female does not have a paid job. These appear to be the traditional
families where the female does not work and the male has a full-time (~
40 houra a week) job. Note that hm is perfectly inelastic with respect~to wf, as it should be and that hm ~ hm íf hf - 0.
Female labor supply is more responsive than male labor supply to
both the male and the female wage rate. If the male wage rate goes up,
female labor supply falls. If the female wage rate rises, female labor
supply rises as well.
The estimates of the parameters am and af, representing the
effect of family size on labor supply, are such that the requirement
that a log C~a log N is posítive is statisfied for all sample points.
That is, the cost of attaining a certain utility level increases with
family size.
Obviously, the highest female participation rate and the largest
number of hours worked by the female, occurs in families without child-
ren. When there are children, the female participation rate is very low,
unless the male wage rate is low or the female wage rate is very high.
In all cases male labor supply is rather inelaetic with respect to
family size.
Finally, we have investigated whether the shadow wage of a non-
participating female exceeded her predicted market wage. In 76Y of all
one earner household this requirement was satisfied. The fact that
wf ~ wf in the other cases might be interpreted as an indication of
involuntary unemployment. In either case, the rationing of the one
earner households is modelled appropríately.
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6. Concluding remarks
Models of household labor supply are usually estimated using
data on two earner families only. Thís approach is motivated by the fact
that the use of data on families with one earner requires the analysis
of corner solutions. Although the theory of rationíng provides an appro-
priate framework for the analysis of corner solutions, only restrictive
functional specifications allow for a closed form for the utility maxi-
mizing labor supply in such cases.
However, using numerical methods, we have estimated a household
labor supply model using data on both one earner and two earner fami-
lies, and using flexible functional forms.
The labor supply functions in figure 1 look definitely non-
linear, indicating the need to use flexible functional forms. The
results presented in table 1 indícate, moreover, that for reasons of
estimation accuracy it is worthwhile to employ observations on both
rationed and unrationed households.
ls
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